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Abstract
This paper examines the micro-politics of Malawi’s 
Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) and the roles of 
agro-dealers as potential anchors or drivers of a ‘uniquely 
African Green Revolution’. The drive toward the 
development of a viable network of agro-dealers is a 
direct consequence of the failure of the liberalization of 
the agricultural sector to trigger a vibrant private 
sector-led market. The agro-dealer initiative was 
introduced to address the question of missing markets 
for the rural farmer and deal once and for all with the 
question of pervasive food insecurity in Malawi.
While agro-dealership has tremendous potential to 
facilitate private sector led agricultural growth and 
development, the implementation of FISP has 
substantially altered the operative context for agro-
dealers. FISP has thrown up considerable challenges that 
require urgent redress if the agricultural sector is to serve 
as an engine of sustainable economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The major finding of this study is that instead 
of functioning as a ‘smart’ subsidy, with huge potential 
for kick-starting the development of viable private 
sector-led agricultural growth, FISP has degenerated into 
an instrument of patronage at various levels. It has been 
captured by a network of elites who have appropriated 
it as a cash cow for rapid wealth accumulation rather 
than as a medium for broadening farmers’ access to 
productivity-enhancing inputs and technologies. The 
elite capture of FISP is primarily due to the institutional 
arrangements that mean that agro-dealers can only 
participate in FISP if and only if they have contracts with 
seed companies. 
These challenges can be dealt with by the design and 
enforcement of a robust policy and institutional 
framework for agro-dealership. Most of the challenges 
revealed in this study are linked to the absence or weak 
enforcement of policy and regulatory frameworks for 
agro-dealers specifically, and the seed industry in general. 
There is therefore urgent need to develop and implement 
a policy and institutional framework for the agro-
dealership that outlines legitimate practices and 
expectations. Such efforts, however, are likely to face 
resistance as a consequence of the expansive rent-
seeking opportunities associated with FISP.
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1. Introduction
The claims by some development agencies that 
fertilizer subsidies are the only way to jump-start African 
agriculture and deliver food security and income benefits 
to the poor are increasingly pervasive (Minot and Benson 
2009). This argument is underpinned by the idea that 
African agriculture is in deep crisis as a result of ‘decades 
of slow growth in the use of modern inputs [which has] 
resulted in missed opportunities to increase African 
agricultural productivity and incomes’ (Kelly et al. 2003: 
379). For African agriculture to experience a significant 
turnaround, it is argued that smallholder farmers must 
dramatically increase their use of productivity-enhancing 
inputs and technologies. The low uptake of productivity-
enhancing inputs and technologies means that food 
security remains a great challenge in the large parts of 
sub-Saharan Africa.
There is, however, some enduring debate about the 
extent to which subsidies can be used to stimulate rural 
market development for inputs in Africa. The question 
is not so much whether or not there is need for subsidies 
in rural Africa but rather how should subsidy programmes 
be designed so as not to distort or displace emerging 
rural markets (AGRA 2007; Kelly et al. 2003). Skeptics 
argue that even the so-called ‘smart’ subsidies cannot 
avoid the well known evils of subsidies. The form of the 
subsidies notwithstanding, the argument is that African 
governments do not have the capacity to administer 
subsidy programmes in a transparent and accountable 
manner without creating expansive opportunities for 
rent-seeking (Minot and Benson 2009; van de Walle 
2001). 
The distinguishing feature of ’smart’ subsidies is the 
use of vouchers as a means for farmers to access inputs 
from competing private sector suppliers. ’Smart’ subsidies 
are defended as mechanisms to provide subsidized 
goods and services designed both to promote market 
development and to enhance the welfare of poor. They 
are thus designed to ‘target the poor and to support, 
rather than undercut, the development of private sector 
input distribution markets’ (Minot and Benson 2009: 4). 
As a strategy for market development, ’smart’ subsidies 
have attracted attention following the apparent failure 
of the liberalization of the agricultural sector. It was 
anticipated that liberalization of the agriculture sector 
would ‘create a more economically sound basis for 
stimulating agricultural productivity and economic 
development’ (Crawford et al. 2003). The liberalization 
of the agricultural sector would thus foster an environment 
that would empower the private sector to take on 
functions that were previously performed by the state. 
More importantly, the private sector would provide 
inputs at lower costs and thereby stimulate input use 
beyond previous levels (Chiwele et al. 1996; Crawford et 
al. 2003). However, the conclusion from various studies 
is that the scale of the private sector response and the 
extent to which it could fully take over the responsibilities 
of government-supported marketing institutions was 
overestimated. Many areas, particularly remote rural 
areas, remained grossly underserved, resulting in a 
dramatic reduction in farmers’ access to productivity 
enhancing inputs and technologies with far reaching 
implications on the food security status of most 
sub-Saharan countries (Kluste 2006; Dorward et al. 
2005).
In Malawi, the debate about the failure of liberalization 
to bring about efficiency and effectiveness in farmers’ 
access to improved inputs and technologies can be 
traced back to the turn of the new millennium. Several 
years after the liberalization of the agricultural sector, 
anticipated benefits were hardly apparent (Nthara 2002; 
Owusu and N’gambi 2002; Chirwa and Chilowa 1997). 
Instead, liberalization of the agricultural sector culminated 
in the problem of food insecurity becoming more or less 
endemic. This was underlined by the country’s progressive 
shift from being nationally self-sufficient in maize in 
non-drought years to being dependent on commercial 
food imports and foreign assistance to meet food needs 
until the introduction of the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP) during the 2005/06 growing season 
(Chinsinga 2009; Devereux 2002).
The debate about the limitations of the liberalization 
of the agricultural sector has become more prominent, 
assuming an international profile following the successful 
implementation of FISP. FISP has transformed Malawi 
from a food deficit to a food surplus country after almost 
two decades of grappling with chronic food insecurity 
(AGRA 2009; Dorward and Chirwa 2009; Chinsinga 2007). 
Since the 2005/06 growing season Malawi has consistently 
enjoyed substantial maize surplus over and above its 
annual food requirements, estimated at 2.1 million metric 
tonnes. For this reason, Malawi’s FISP is touted as a perfect 
example of a successful ’smart’ subsidy. The Alliance for 
a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) uses FISP as a point 
of reference in arguing its case for ’smart’ subsidies as 
the only feasible way to jump-start African agriculture 
in order to transform it into an engine of economic 
development for sustainable poverty reduction.
The main argument is that ’smart’ subsidies are 
indispensable if African agriculture is to take a quantum 
leap forward to spearhead transformative change. 
Through ’smart’ subsidies, AGRA argues that African 
countries can facilitate the emergence of private sector 
led sustainable agricultural growth through the 
promotion of a network of agro-dealers (AGRA, 2007). 
An agro-dealer is a locally-based entrepreneur who sells 
seeds, fertilizer and agro-chemicals to poor farmers in 
remote areas. The overall vision is that a network of small-
scale, entrepreneurial agro-dealers would transform the 
currently fragmented input distribution system into an 
efficient, commercially viable input infrastructure which 
would in turn enable farmers to have greater access to 
productivity enhancing inputs and technologiesi (Adesina 
2009). This vision is inspired by the fact that lack of access 
to basic farm supplies has made it quite challenging for 
poor rural farmers to increase their yield or income, 
reinforcing widespread poverty. As reflected in the 
sentiments below, agro-dealer programmes are 
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considered a central element in the jigsaw puzzle to 
power a uniquely African Green Revolution.
The agro-dealer programmes build 
on great initial success in Malawi 
which has seen the country 
transform itself from being a net 
importer to a net exporter of maize, 
and even become a donor of food 
to neighbouring countries. If Malawi 
can do it, it can be done by every 
country in Africa (AGRA 2009: 1)
This optimism is, however, not borne out in critical 
reviews of the Malawi’s FISP. For instance, according to 
Chinsinga (2010), the implementation of FISP has 
transformed the country’s seed industry in a way that 
makes it less capable of driving the anticipated Green 
Revolution on a sustainable basis. The primacy of food 
security in Malawi’s politics has contributed to the 
creation of a seed industry dominated by the multinational 
seed companies, offering farmers a rather limited range 
of products, mainly hybrid maize seed, through a network 
of agro-dealers, and in which alternative seed systems 
are almost at the verge of extinction. The interests of 
seed companies, donors and government have coincided 
for different reasons to create a seed industry that has a 
very narrow product portfolio and distributes benefits 
to a very small proportion of the population through 
various schemes of political patronage buoyed by 
weaknesses in the regulatory framework of the seed 
industry.
The main motivation of this paper therefore is to 
critically examine the micro-politics of FISP and the role 
played by agro-dealers within it. Agro-dealers are touted 
as the main drivers of the potential sustainable version 
of the Green Revolution in Malawi. This is of particular 
interest in view of the fact that Malawi’s FISP is not only 
widely regarded as a model of success for the rest African 
countries to emulate but it has also been firmly pushed 
to the centre of the country’s political economy in several 
important ways. FISP has been an electoral battleground 
during the last two general elections in May 2004 and 
2009.
The paper uses a political economy conceptual 
framework to interrogate the micro-political dynamics 
about agro-dealers as potential anchors or drivers of a 
uniquely African version of sustainable Green Revolution 
within the framework of FISP. The political economy 
approach emphasizes the importance of understanding 
the political, economic and social processes that promote 
or block pro-poor change as well as the role of institutions, 
power and the underlying context for policy processes 
(Synder 2005). The political economy approach offers an 
alternative to the technocratic perspective about policy 
making. It shifts the focus towards the discussions, 
negotiations, approvals and implementations that are 
at the core of the ‘messy’ world of politics (Araujo et al. 
2004). The implication of this is that policy processes can 
be adversarial, characterized by the clash of competing 
interests and viewpoints rather than an impartial, 
disinterested and objective search for correct technical 
solutions. Furthermore, the context in which policy 
processes take place matter a great deal since the chance 
of success of these policies cannot be judged  on their 
theoretical or technical attributes without considering 
the institutional, political and cultural context in which 
they are applied (Chinsinga et al. 2011). 
The main argument of this paper is that the introduction 
of FISP has dramatically changed the operative context 
of agro-dealers in a manner that is less conducive to the 
attainment of the sustainable version of the uniquely 
African Green Revolution. Instead of functioning as a 
’smart’ subsidy with tremendous potential to kick-start 
robust private sector led agricultural growth, FISP has 
simply degenerated into an instrument of patronage. 
FISP has been captured by a network of elites who have 
appropriated it as a cash cow for rapid wealth 
accumulation rather than as a medium for broadening 
farmers’ access to productivity enhancing inputs and 
technologies as a lever for sustainable rural transformation 
and prosperity. This elite capture has far reaching 
implications for the realization of a sustainable version 
of a uniquely African Green Revolution. Following this 
introduction, Section 2 outlines the empirical setting of 
the study with particular focus on how the fieldwork was 
carried out, data analyzed, and key conclusions drawn. 
Section 3 critically examines the debates about the 
overall efficacy of the liberalization of the agricultural 
sector and how the failure of liberalization to bring about 
the anticipated benefits has led to the emergence of the 
agro-dealer concept as a strategy for redefining the role 
of the private sector in revitalizing African agriculture. 
Section 4 explores the evolution of the agro-dealer 
concept in Malawi. Two phases are identified for which 
successes as well as challenges are highlighted with 
particular reference to the transformative impact of FISP 
on the dynamics of agro-dealerships in rural Malawi. 
Section 5 offers concluding remarks and reflections, 
highlighting some lessons learnt about agro-dealers and 
subsidies in Malawi.
2. Empirical Setting of the 
Study
This paper is based on fieldwork carried out in two 
districts of Malawi between November and December 
2010. In the southern region, the fieldwork was carried 
out in Thyolo district, whilst in the central region, the 
fieldwork was carried out in Dedza district. These districts 
were purposefully chosen in order to provide a strategic 
framework for systematically testing the key hypotheses 
of the study outlined below. Dedza and Thyolo were 
chosen because they belong not only to distinct agro-
ecological zones but because they also represent high 
and low agricultural yield potential areas, respectively. 
Malawi is divided into four agro-ecological zones based 
on altitude. These include Lower Shire Valley (<200m), 
Low altitude (200-760m), Middle (760-1300m) and High 
altitude (>1300m). Dedza and Thyolo fall into the Middle 
and High altitude zones, respectively (Chinsinga 2007). 
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As a high agricultural yield potential area, Dedza is touted 
as one of the breadbasket districts of Malawi. It is one of 
the leading maize and tobacco growing districts, with a 
landholding size that is substantially higher than the 
national average. The average landholding size in the 
district ranges between 0.7-1 hectare compared to the 
national average at below 0.5 hectare (Chinsinga 2008; 
Chirwa 2004 ). As a low agricultural yield potential district, 
Thyolo grapples with serious land constraints, is densely 
populated, and much of the cultivable land is taken up 
by tea and coffee estates.
The study was carried out at three levels - national, 
district and local - using mainly semi-structured interviews 
and focus group discussions (FGDs) as instruments for 
data collection. The fieldwork was divided into two main 
phases. The first phase focused at the national level where 
semi-structured interviews were carried out with the 
Citizen Network for Foreign Affairs (CFNA)/Rural Market 
Development Trust (RUMARK) officials, relevant National 
Government Organisations (NGOs), relevant donor 
agencies, MoAFS officials, and seed companies. The 
second phase focused on the district and local levels. At 
the district level, semi-structured interviews were carried 
out with MoAFS officials, relevant NGOs, and agro-
dealers. The entry point at the local level was the Extension 
Planning Areas (EPAs). Each district is sub-divided into 
EPAs which are considered as a planning jurisdiction for 
agricultural activities below the district level. Dedza and 
Thyolo have 12 and 10 EPAs, respectively, and in each of 
the districts, half of the EPAs were randomly sampled. 
One FGD with a mixed group of farmers was held in each 
of the sampled EPAs and agro-dealers operating in these 
EPAs were interviewedii . Overall, a total of 50 semi-
structured interviews were held at national, district and 
local levels.
The primary data was further complemented with a 
review of secondary data sources on agro-dealers, 
subsidies and rural market development in Malawi. There 
was, however, a notable gap in the literature, as little 
work has been done in the past on agro-dealers, subsidies 
and rural market development. Rather, most studies have 
focused on the critical evaluation of the overall efficacy 
of FISP as it relates to a broadly defined private sector.
This study was designed to test the following 
hypotheses:
Agro-dealers operate primarily in high potential areas  •
and supply seed commercially only to the relatively 
well-off farmers.
Agro-dealers supply mostly hybrid and OPV from large  •
seed companies.
Most farmers do not rely on agro-dealers to supply  •
seed.
Agro-dealers service richer male farmers to the  •
exclusion of poorer and female farmers.
Agro-dealerships are mostly owned by elites who make  •
connections with government- donor/NGO 
programmes or large scale seed houses.
The terms of engagement between agro-dealers and  •
seed companies is skewed in favour of seed 
companies.
Over time, large agri-businesses (especially  •
multinationals) are dominating the supply of seed into 
the formal seed system, reducing the proportion of 
locally bred seed by public systems.
The variety of seed available to farmers through agro- •
dealers is declining over time.
All of the above are accentuated and perpetuated by  •
support programmes funded by the government and 
external donors.
Such programmes provide multiple opportunities for  •
rent-seeking and profit-taking by agro-dealers and 
other elites.
3. Liberalization of the 
Agricultural Sector: 
Expectations and 
Realities
The liberalization of the agricultural sector was an 
integral part of the structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) that were expected to stimulate agricultural 
production through market liberalization and improved 
macro-economic management (Mvula et al. 2003; Mwase 
1998). The popular diagnosis was that the agricultural 
sector in Africa was inefficient because it was dominated 
by state parastatals in both input and output marketing. 
This did not lead to the progressive development of a 
viable marketing framework in the agricultural sector 
because state parastatals were not guided by the forces 
of supply and demand. They were primarily concerned 
with social issues rather than taking on a business focus 
influenced by values of efficiency and effectiveness 
(Mwase 1998; Chiwele et al. 1996). This was inevitable 
because state parastatals in the agricultural sector 
suffered from enormous political pressures, bureaucratic 
failure, and lack of financial discipline, all of which resulted 
in poor performance in terms of output and financial 
outlay. According to the influential work of Bates (1981), 
state dominance in the input and output marketing 
arrangements in the agricultural sector was often more 
effective in meeting government’s patronage objectives 
than in raising the poor farmers’ access to inputs and 
guaranteeing decent returns on their produce.
The track record of state parastatals provided a strong 
basis for advocating for the liberalization of the agricultural 
sector. Liberalization was considered a panacea to the 
sector stagnation. According to Crawford et al. (2003), 
liberalization would ensure a more economically viable 
private sector, driven by an agricultural marketing system 
and by economic development. This was rooted in the 
belief that well functioning markets underpin important 
opportunities for welfare improvements at the micro-
level which then aggregate into sustainable macro-level 
growth. Liberalization of the agricultural sector, it was 
argued, made sense because of the nature of the 
agricultural sector: while agriculture is public in terms 
of policy and programme needs, it is private in production, 
marketing, and consumption decisions (Barret and 
Matambatsere 2005; Mwase 1998). 
Working Paper 031 www.future-agricultures.org8
When the agricultural sector was finally liberalized, it 
was widely expected that the vacuum left by the 
withdrawal of state parastatals would be quickly filled 
up by private traders (Crawford et al. 2003; Chiwele et 
al. 1996). The dominance of the private sector would then 
create an efficient marketing system that would ‘provide 
inputs at lower costs and thereby stimulate input use 
beyond previous levels’ (Crawford et al. 2003: 279). 
According to Kelly et al. (2003), liberalization would 
incentivize the private sector to expand input distribution 
networks to zones and farmers who lacked access. In 
other words, liberalization would create an efficient, 
effective and responsive private sector-driven marketing 
system that would stimulate production, regulate 
supplies to consumers, and revitalize production and 
inter- and intra-regional trade.
However, for most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the projected benefits of the liberalization of the 
agricultural sector remain a pipe dream (Barret and 
Mutambatsere 2005; Chinsinga 2004). The network of 
input and output markets is yet to take shape except in 
areas that are readily accessible and widely considered 
as agricultural hotspots that are often dominated by 
export-orientated agriculture. In Malawi, for instance, 
the overall assessment was that the withdrawal of the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC) from most areas contributed to the widespread 
food insecurity among smallholder farmers, especially 
those in remote areas whose holdings are nearly 
inaccessible to private traders (Chinsinga 2004; Oxfam 
2002). This failure is attributed to the partial liberalization 
of the sector, weak institutions and coordination problems 
(Doward et al. 2005). 
Comparisons with Asian experiences have featured 
prominently in the critique of agricultural liberalization 
in Africa. According to Dessai (1988), Asian agricultural 
success is attributed largely to investments in agricultural 
research, extension, credit, and fertilizer distribution and 
supply systems, rather than to marginal changes in the 
prices of either crops or fertilizer. The failure of the African 
agricultural sector liberalization can be linked to the lack 
of strategic focus in the conceptualization and 
implementation of liberalization reforms (Barret and 
Mutambatsere 2005; Crawford et al. 2003). Such reform 
attempts focused on macro-economic reforms designed 
to improve agricultural price incentives rather than on 
non-price stimulants that influence macro-economic 
decision making, such as the investment in public goods. 
This limited investment in public goods – the ‘undeveloped 
physical communications, power and transport 
infrastructure, credit constraints and continued 
bureaucratic impediments that increase transaction costs 
for input suppliers’ (Barret and Matambatsere 2005) – and 
the simultaneous constrained development of private 
sector input-led agricultural intensification, failed to fill 
the void created by the withdrawal of state marketing 
structures. These sentiments are aptly reechoed by 
Crawford et al. (2003: 255).
The private sectors’ apparently 
weak response to input market 
liberalization may not reflect a 
failure of the private sector or 
market per se but may reflect an 
underinvestment in traditional 
public goods (infrastructure, 
appropriate extension messages, 
R&D investments) that l imit 
profitability of using purchased 
inputs.
To a large extent, the emergence of agro-dealership 
is an integral part of the efforts to seek for alternative 
strategies to foster the progressive development of a 
private sector-driven input and output marketing system. 
Typically, agro-dealers are rural shop owners trained by 
NGOs on general business management and technical 
knowledge of agricultural inputs to reach farmers in rural 
areas (AGRA 2007; Kelly et al. 2003). The main goal of 
agro-dealership is to revive agricultural markets by 
addressing questions of scarcity and high costs of basic 
farm input supplies such as fertilizer, seed and agro-
chemicals.
As a rural market development intermediation 
strategy, the agro-dealership works out as follows: NGOs 
identify rural shop owners who are trained in business 
skills, product knowledge, safe handling and use of 
modern technology. More specifically, the owners are 
trained in areas such as knowledge of seeds, fertilizers 
and agro-chemicals, book keeping, costing and pricing, 
managing business relations, sales and marketing, stock 
management and managing working capital. The idea 
is that following the training, the agro-dealers should 
be linked to major input supply companies using a credit 
guarantee scheme which covers some of the risk-related 
costs normally borne by firms building rural input supply 
networks (Kelly et al. 2003). It is envisaged that agro-
dealerships would kick-start the development of a 
sustainable private sector led agricultural marketing 
system because scaling up is dependent on the ability 
of agro-dealers to sell their products and repay credit. 
The expectation is that the agro-dealers would also be 
providers of basic extension services to farmers, creating 
an invaluable source of knowledge and advice to farmers 
(AGRA, 2009).
4. Agro-dealers and Rural 
Market Development in 
Malawi
Two distinct phases of agro-dealer development in 
Malawi can be distinguished since the turn of the new 
millennium. These are: 1) the phase of ideal agro-
dealership (2001-2005); and 2) the phase of FISP agro-
dealership (2005-to date). 
By the close of the 1990s, the problem of food insecurity 
in Malawi had become more or less endemic. The swift 
liberalization of the agricultural sector in the mid 1990s 
did not produce the anticipated results (Owusu and 
N’gambi 2002). The removal of the fertilizer and hybrid 
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maize subsidies against the backdrop of a sharply 
devalued local currency made farm inputs virtually 
unaffordable to the majority of the chronically 
impoverished farmers. The situation was made worse 
because private traders did not emerge to fill up the 
vacuum created following the withdrawal of ADMARC 
from both input and output markets. Overall, the 
productivity of the agricultural sector plummeted to such 
an extent that the country became routinely dependent 
on commercial food imports and foreign assistance to 
meet food needs (Chinsinga 2005; Devereux 2002).
This predicament forced the government to critically 
review the key constraints affecting productivity in the 
agricultural sector. Through the International Fertilizer 
Development Centre (IFDC), the government 
commissioned a study to review the status of the entire 
Malawian agricultural sector. The study established that 
‘there was little private sector penetration into the rural 
areas despite a fairly flourishing agro-input sector’ iii. The 
private sector traders that emerged concentrated their 
activities in trading centres, largely serving those areas 
considered as agricultural hotspots. The study also 
established that farmers lacked access to productivity 
enhancing inputs and technologies, and were ‘traveling 
50 to 100km to procure inputs which was very costly and 
prohibitive for them’ iv. Since farmers could not access 
productivity enhancing inputs and technologies, the 
country was invariably locked up in a low productivity 
trap, pushing the country on the precipice of a hunger 
crisis.
The study culminated in the conception of the Malawi 
Agricultural Input and Output Development (MAIOD) 
Programme which was comprised of 15 different 
components, one of which targeted sustainable input 
development systems in Malawi. This component then 
became the basis for the formation of the agro-dealer 
initiative. Through the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security (MoAFS), the programme was marketed to 
potential donors, and eventually resulted in the launch 
of an agro-dealer development programme with the 
support of the Citizen Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA) 
and IFDC. They received financial support from the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), respectively. 
Both CNFA and IFDC worked with local organizations to 
roll out the agro-dealer development programme. CNFA 
established the Rural Market Development Trust 
(RUMARK), whereas IFDC worked with the Agro-input 
Suppliers Association of Malawi (AISAM). RUMARK and 
AISAM provided training to potential agro-dealers who 
would in turn expand access to productivity enhancing 
inputs and technologies among farmers. The overall goal 
of the programme was ‘to promote agro-dealership in 
order to penetrate underserved rural areas’ v.
4.1 Ideal Agro-dealership  
 Phase (2001-2005)
According to the agro-dealer programme concept, 
an ideal agro-dealer is an existing business person, 
preferably a rural shop owner, with skills and competence 
that can be developed to suit agro-input work (dealing 
with seeds, fertilizer and chemicals) (AGRA 2007; Kelly 
et al. 2003). In other words, ideal agro-dealers operate 
small businesses that reach poor farmers in rural areas. 
This phase of agro-dealership was closely linked to the 
activities of RUMARK and AISAM. The overall mandate 
of these organizations was to train potential agro-dealers 
in business management and technical knowledge of 
agricultural inputs to help them impart basic knowledge 
to farmers so as to enable them to maximize returns from 
the productivity enhancing inputs and technologies. 
The difference between the stated numbers of agro-
dealers trained and those that are actively applying their 
newly gained knowledge and skills varies a great deal. 
Both RUMARK and AISAM claim to have trained more 
than 3,000 agro-dealers since they rolled out the 
programme, but estimate that less than 40 percent are 
active. From the interviews conducted, RUMARK indicated 
that they have trained 1,500 where AISAM has trained 
1,128 agro-dealers. However, they observed that it is 
difficult to keep accurate accounts of the numbers of 
agro-dealers because they do not have the capacity to 
utilize geographical information system (GIS) to generate 
maps locating active agro-dealers. This manner of GIS 
application in Kenya has demonstrated its important role 
in improving market knowledge and relaying more 
in-depth information to the input supply companies 
(AGRA 2007). The collapse of the credit guarantee scheme 
has introduced further difficulties for the RUMARK and 
AISAM in keeping track of active agro-dealers. Thus, while 
many are trained, quite few end up ‘venturing into agro-
dealership because of serious capital constraints’ vi.
For the majority of this phase, AISAM and RUMARK 
linked the agro-dealer trainees either to seed companies 
or financial institutions to enable them to embark on 
their agro-input work through a credit guarantee facility. 
In this arrangement, RUMARK and AISAM were 
guaranteeing 50 percent of the credit facility extended 
to the agro-dealers. However, the tripartite relationship 
between seed companies, agro-dealers and the agro-
dealer training institutions broke down due to ‘the failure 
of the training institutions to nurture and properly 
manage the relationship’ vii. In particular, seed companies 
and financial institutions were concerned with the 
administrative fees charged by AISAM and RUMARK as 
intermediaries as ‘their track record in remitting funds 
to the companies was not satisfactory’ viii. In addition, 
there were high default rates among the agro-dealers 
partly because the companies ‘pushed the administrative 
fee paid to the intermediaries to the agro-dealers’ ix.
The breakdown of the tripartite arrangement 
somewhat transformed the agro-dealership landscape. 
Two major changes are worth noting. Seed companies 
embarked on their own agro-dealership programmes, 
whilst drawing from the pool of agro-dealers trained by 
AISAM and RUMARK. Remaining agro-dealer trainees 
were left to find their own ways to ‘link themselves 
with seed companies in order to get contracts’ x. The 
breakdown of the tripartite arrangement progressively 
Working Paper 031 www.future-agricultures.org10
led to the informalisation of the interface between agro-
dealers and seed companies.
According to both seed company officials and agro-
dealers, securing an agro-dealer contract depends, to 
a large extent, on social networks. Most seed company 
officials indicated that ‘the ultimate selection of agro-
dealers depends primarily on the knowledge of 
prospective candidates’ xi. This was justified as the basis 
for ‘reducing bad debts because the relationship is built 
on already existing trust’ xii. In some cases, new agro-
dealers are identified on recommendation of established 
agro-dealers with credible track records with seed 
companies. Agro-dealers identified in this way are often 
placed under the supervision of the agro-dealers that 
recommended them to the seed companies, ‘graduating 
when they have established their own credible track 
records’ xiii. This suggests that it is not easy for trainee 
agro-dealers to get linked up with seed companies if 
they are not part of appropriate social networks. This is 
perhaps aptly illustrated by the experiences of one of the 
agro-dealers encountered in Dedza Boma EPA during 
fieldwork, described below (Box I).
There are several issues and challenges that can be 
raised in relation to Phase 1 of the agro-dealership 
development programme. These include the elitism of 
agro-dealer selection, mistargeted training, and a maize 
bias by seed companies.
4.1.1 Elitism of Agro-
dealerships
Agro-dealership is elitist for two reasons. First, the capital 
requirement for a businessman to become an agro-dealer 
is quite substantial, estimated at MK 6,000,000 (about 
US $40,000) in addition to the ownership of business 
infrastructure and storage facilities. The agro-dealership 
training is also not free: potential agro-dealers must pay 
MK 7,000 (US $40) for a week-long training programme. 
These requirements prevent a large proportion of people 
from participating in agro-dealership. Secondly, most 
of the agro-dealers chosen by seed companies are not 
small rural-based businessmen. During the interviews 
conducted throughout this study, agro-dealers were 
generally described as ‘middle class businessmen since 
often agro-dealers from the lower classes have failed to 
survive as long, as they are not linked to other lines of 
businesses because of the seasonal nature of agriculture 
in Malawi’ xv. It is estimated that up to 90 percent of the 
agro-dealers are middle class business entrepreneurs or 
simply an elite group of farmers.
The elitism of agro-dealerships is further reflected 
in the business model of the permanent agro-dealers. 
Successful agro-dealers have a diversified business 
portfolio. They are not entirely dependent on ‘the agro-
inputs line of [work] because of the seasonal nature of 
agriculture’ xvi. This means that agro-dealers have no 
choice but to diversify their business portfolio ‘in order 
to smooth their flow of income, since the demand for 
agro-inputs is extremely low during the off - peak season’ 
xvii. Consequently, agro-dealers have to be people who 
are already established entrepreneurs. There are very 
few agro-dealers that focus exclusively on agro-inputs. 
Agro-dealers are urged to diversify into buying produce 
and agro-processing as a strategy to ‘prevent them from 
getting out of business during off season when the 
demand for agro-inputs is essentially non-existent’ xviii. 
Consequently, the benefits of agro-dealership have 
been captured by those prosperous entrepreneurs 
that have been able to produce the required resources 
upfront. Even so, as pointed out earlier, agro-dealers 
on the whole have been indiscriminately exploited by 
seed companies pushing the overhead costs levied by 
RUMARK and AISAM on to the agro-dealers. Both the 
intermediary institutions and seed companies have 
promoted their own interests at the expense of the 
agro-dealers.
4.1.2 Mistargeted Training
There is widespread concern that agro-dealer training 
is mistargeted. Training is offered to proprietors and not 
to those who actually sell agro-products to farmers. The 
underlying assumption is that trained proprietors will in 
turn pass on their newly acquired knowledge and skills 
to their shop attendants, which isn’t necessarily the case. 
While acknowledging that the training is mistargeted, 
seed companies indicated that they have back up 
arrangements to ensure that shop attendants are trained 
on product knowledge in order for them to provide 
expert advice to farmers. In this regard, seed companies 
employ merchandisers during peak periods (October to 
December) ‘in order to equip shop attendants with 
product knowledge’ xix. However, this is often limited to 
key trading centres. 
From the fieldwork that was conducted during this 
study, there is no evidence to support claims that shop 
attendants are trained on product knowledge either by 
the proprietors or, indeed, by seed companies. According 
Box 1. Informality in Contracts with Seed 
Companies
A wife to an established agro-dealer narrated how 
her experiences underpin the growing informality 
in the award of contracts to agro-dealers. She 
indicated that she went in person to a seed 
company to seek a contract as a distributor of seed 
during the 2009/10 FISP season. She was turned 
down on the account that she was late and she 
was advised that her application will be filed for 
consideration during the next FISP season. Her 
husband followed up with the seed company and 
it happened that the official in charge of the 
process was her husband’s old time school friend. 
Consequently they were no longer late. She 
observed that ‘we were not only squeezed in but 
got a much bigger allocation than what we had 
initially applied for’ xiv.
Source: Fieldwork, December 2010, Dedza Boma EPA
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to most agricultural officers interviewed, shop owners 
tend to train their attendants ‘not specifically [about] 
agro-inputs but [rather] in general business transactions 
such as accounting and record keeping’. According to 
most agricultural officials, agro-dealers have no interest 
in offering credible advice to farmers because ‘they are 
essentially vendors whose overriding goal is to dispose 
of their products regardless of whether they are correct 
ones or not’ xx. This suggests that agro-dealers are 
primarily motivated by profit considerations such that 
‘cases of agro-dealers providing conflicting instructions 
to farmers are rampant’ xxi.
This defeats the whole idea of agro-dealers serving 
to complement the provision of extension services (AGRA 
2007; Kelly et al. 2003). It is therefore not surprising that 
in their current functioning capacity agro-dealers do not 
contribute a great deal to the goals of the African Green 
Revolution. None of the agro-dealers encountered in 
either district demonstrated an understanding of the 
notion of the African Green Revolution, let alone their 
role in it. As discussed earlier, this is due to the fixation 
of agro-dealers on making as much profit as possible 
and not necessarily on functioning as conduits of the 
African Green Revolution. In the conceptualization of 
the agro-dealership development programme, the role 
of agro-dealers is to serve as a reference point and a 
supportive figure to the currently lean extension 
superstructure, aiding Malawian farmers in their 
progression towards food security and economic 
prosperity. 
4.1.3 Maize Bias
At the peak of the tripartite arrangement between 
agro-dealers, seed companies and the agro-dealer 
training institutions, demonstration plots were a regular 
feature as one of the strategies for extension. Even 
though the tripartite arrangement has broken down, 
joint demonstration plots sponsored by seed companies 
are still carried out, albeit irregularly. The purpose of the 
demonstration plots is ‘to witness to farmers about which 
crop varieties are agronomically suitable for their 
respective localities’ xxii. However, the main concern of 
these plots is the almost exclusive focus of seed companies 
on maize due to their ‘concern for food security, 
[subsequently] marginalizing other crops, as food security 
is erroneously equated with maize’ xxiii. The dominance 
of maize is inevitable since seed companies involved deal 
almost exclusively either in hybrid or OPV maize. The 
seed companies have thus used the agro-dealership 
initiative to promote their materials at the expense of a 
wider portfolio of seeds which farmers need in order to 
exercise choice and crop diversification.  However, as 
long as the diversified provision of seed does not serve 
the primary interests of the multinational seed companies, 
this service to farmers, imperative to the sustainability 
of agriculture, will go unprovided.
4.2 FISP Agro-dealership 
Phase (2005 to date)
Phase 2 of the agro-dealership development 
programme is linked to the introduction of FISP during 
the 2005/06 growing season. Prior to the introduction 
of FISP, the Malawian government implemented other 
input programmes. The magnitude of their services, 
however, was rather limited, having little impact on the 
commercial market of inputs (Dorward et al. 2007). In 
the initial phase of FISP, the funding and distribution of 
agricultural inputs continued to be handled exclusively 
by government agencies. Furthermore, the package 
offered to farmers focused solely on maize and tobacco 
(Chinsinga 2007). Donors interested in supporting FISP, 
however, lobbied for the involvement of the private 
sector as a means of kick-starting agricultural growth 
through the use of vouchers. These donors also lobbied 
for the use of FISP as a mechanism for diversifying away 
from maize, by incentivising legume agriculture, as a 
means of boosting farmers’ incomes, household nutrition, 
and enhancing and preserving soil health (Harrigan 2005; 
Potter 2005). Following this lobbying, agro-dealers also 
gained involvement in the seed component of FISP, as 
a condition of donor support (Chinsinga 2007). 
Agricultural inputs that were previously monopolized 
by government agencies were shifted to FISP, 
subsequently putting 70 percent of input suppliers out 
of business (Dorward et al. 2007). 
In the 2006/07 growing season, the private sector, 
through agro-dealers, became involved in the distribution 
of seed and fertilizer.  During the following season, 
however, this involvement was withdrawn on the back 
of allegations about ‘the failure to track fake vouchers 
and unorthodox business practices, which, among 
others, involved agro-dealers adulterating fertilizer and 
exchanging vouchers with other commodities such as 
iron sheets, bicycles etc’ xxiv, and has remained withdrawn 
to date. The distribution of fertilizer is now monopolized 
by two government agencies: the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and 
Smallholder Farmer Fertilizer Revolving Fund of Malawi 
(SFFRFM). The private sector, however, is involved in the 
procurement of fertilizer through a competitive tendering 
process and in the transportation of fertilizers to 
distribution centres run by ADMARC and SFFRFM. 
Whilst concerns over the malpractices of agro-dealers 
may be justified, in so far as their involvement in the 
distribution of fertilizer, most stakeholders interviewed 
during this study argued that their withdrawal serves 
other purposes than simply promoting and safeguarding 
the welfare of farmers. It is argued that the ‘desire to 
promote the interest of farmers is merely an official 
rhetoric; the underlying interest for government is to 
exploit the programme for strategic political goals’ xxv. 
This particular argument is twofold. First, the popular 
view is that the government would like to control the 
distribution of fertilizer in line with its strategic political 
goals. The argument is that ‘government can easily target 
constituencies that are considered politically significant 
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in boosting its support base against the backdrop that 
food security is at the centre of the country’s political 
economy’ xxvi. Second, the procurement and transportation 
contracts are exploited as a source of political patronage 
‘to reward entrepreneurs, their technical competence 
notwithstanding, as long as they have demonstrated 
support to the regime materially and financially’ xxvii. 
The recurrent observation among both donor agencies 
and government officials was that ‘while there is a 
seemingly transparent tendering process for procurement 
and transportation of fertilizer, the ultimate list of 
successful bidders is often different from the one arrived 
at during the transparent process of scrutinizing 
bidders’xxviii. In some cases, new suppliers are included 
even though they did not officially bid for the tenders 
and volumes assigned to various bidders on the basis of 
technical evaluation of their competencies are altered. 
Politically favoured bidders often have their allocations 
increased even though they did not demonstrate capacity 
to deliver such amounts xxix. Some technically competent 
and established dealers are excluded altogether which 
‘raises a serious concern about the sustainability of the 
fertilizer industry because some of those involved have 
not made investments in the industry; they are simply 
opportunists’ xxx.They are thus more likely to exit the 
industry as soon as FISP comes to an end. The design 
and implementation of FISP are such that they have 
created strategic opportunities for politicians to exploit 
the programme for their selfish goals, whilst at the same 
time ‘appearing to be providing a lasting solution to the 
chronic and pervasive food security problem in the 
country xxxi ’ 
Agro-dealers participate in the FISP seed component 
through contracts with seed companies. The arrangement 
is such that seed companies are guaranteed a market 
for their products through FISP since they do not have 
to tender for their participation (Chinsinga 2011). FISP 
receives supplies from seed companies on the basis of 
their capacity being bolstered by their marketing 
strategies and the superiority of their products, amongst 
other benefits that they supply. However, it is only seed 
companies belonging to the Seed Traders Association 
of Malawi (STAM) that can redeem vouchers from the 
government for seed sold to farmers under FISP. This 
implies that agro-dealers can participate in FISP only 
when they secure contracts with seed companies, which 
has greatly contributed to the degeneration of FISP into 
an instrument of patronage serving primarily the interests 
of a few privileged elites. In addition to the elite capture 
of FISP, it has also led to a string of negative developments 
that undermine the prospects of developing a viable 
agro-dealer network, let alone a sustainable version of 
an African Green Revolution. The seed companies have 
negotiated their involvement in FISP in a way that 
safeguards their interests. Each stakeholder is interested 
in pushing the burden of adjustment elsewhere in order 
to maximize their own returns (Chinsinga 2007; Scoones 
2005). 
The introduction of FISP has had tremendous 
transformative impact on the operative context of 
Malawian agro-dealers in a manner that threatens the 
realization of a sustainable version of an African Green 
Revolution. Instead of functioning as ’smart’ subsidy with 
huge potential to kick-start the development of a viable 
private sector led agricultural growth, FISP has 
degenerated into an instrument of patronage. Used as 
a means of personal gain by a network of elites, FISP has 
been appropriated as a cash cow for rapid wealth 
accumulation rather than as a medium for broadening 
farmers’ access to productivity enhancing inputs and 
technologies. 
4.2.1 Growing Patronage in 
FISP Contracts
The profits associated with FISP have had a significant 
impact on the dynamics of agro-dealerships. As the 
purpose and goals of FISP gave way to a deepening abuse 
of networking relationships, informality in awarding 
agro-dealer contracts increased, together with the 
promotion of a culture of insider trading. Seed company 
officials are reported to have captured a considerable 
share of agro-dealership contracts. 
The traditional ‘agro-dealer’, as advocated by RUMARK 
and AISAM, has effectively been marginalized as 
‘increasingly contracts with seed companies are 
dependent on informal ties and social networks’ xxxii. FISP 
has promoted patronage regarding the expansion of the 
agro-dealer network that is ‘largely comprised of a 
network of elites involving mainly former and current 
seed company officials and retired, as well as serving, 
white collar employees, such as lawyers and bankers 
among many others, including those working outside 
the country’ xxxiii. This means that most of the traditional 
agro-dealers have subsequently been driven out of 
business.
Seed companies do not dispute the fact that informal 
considerations play an important part in their decisions 
to award contracts to prospective agro-dealers, explaining 
that their position is determined by simple ‘business 
logic’. In regards to maximizing returns from FISP, seed 
companies argue that ‘we have to work with people we 
can trust, which invariably brings into the mix a great 
deal of informality’ . The following sentiments illustrate 
the pervasiveness of informality in the award of contracts 
to agro-dealers: ‘seed companies do not advertize 
vacancies for agro-dealers but we know where to go, 
when to go and who to speak to’ xxxv; ‘big bosses just 
award each other contracts arguing contracts are 
dependent on trust which rules out many of us who are 
not known to the seed company officials’ xxxvi; and ‘what 
is clear is that the majority of agro-dealer outlets are 
owned by people who are based in urban areas since 
they are either acquaintances or simply know the senior 
company officials’ xxxvii.
As mentioned previously, the problem of insider 
trading also appears to be widespread. This concern was 
strongly voiced not only by agro-dealers but also 
agricultural officials. The following sentiments are 
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illustrative of the magnitude of the concern: ‘agro-dealer 
outlets are increasingly being opened by seed company 
officials arguing that we (agro-dealers) are making a lot 
of money out of the FISP programme’ xxxviii; ‘agro-dealers 
that are FISP-based are not only agents of seed companies 
but most of them are either partly or wholly owned by 
seed company officials’ xxxix; ‘FISP agro-dealers are just 
like what we have experienced under the National Aids 
Commission (NAC) whereby big bosses working there 
establish community based organizations (CBOs) run by 
people from the village but primarily as a way of getting 
the money meant for HIV/AIDS for themselves’ xl. 
As argued by van de Walle (2001), FISP has invariably 
created expansive opportunities for rent-seeking that 
have been seized disproportionately by a network of 
elites. The current primary requirement for prospective 
agro-dealers is simply to demonstrate that they have 
capacity to store seeds. The only critical hurdle on the 
part of the agro-dealers is to secure a contract with seed 
companies. Seed companies deliver seeds directly to the 
premises of successful agro-dealer candidates free of 
charge. Agro-dealers may therefore start making money 
as soon as they start distributing the seeds to farmers. 
They may then receive a top up of MK 100 for each 
coupon received and a commission of 10 percent, which 
is dependent on the total volume of sales. Most agro-
dealers interviewed indicated that their involvement in 
FISP is profitable because ‘they [seed companies] supply 
us with seeds without capital but this makes securing 
contracts with seed companies a game of chance’ xli. They 
also related that ‘we do not need capital to buy seed 
from seed companies; seed companies deliver them to 
us as long as we have contracts with them’ xlii. Several 
agro-dealers observed ‘we survive on [FISP] because all 
you need is to convince seed companies that you can 
sell on their behalf’ xliii. The expression of such sentiments 
demonstrates the attraction of agro-dealership roles 
within the framework of FISP. Additionally, agro-dealers 
only require modest resources for overheads such as 
wages for sales personnel or rent for premises used as 
outlets for subsidized seed, further strengthening them 
as a profitable tool for seed companies. 
4.2.2 Rise of Seasonal Agro-
dealers
There are two categories of agro-dealers that have 
developed over the period of transition brought on 
during the liberalization of the agricultural sector: 
permanent and seasonal. Most of the private sector 
actors that emerged during the transitional period 
between the withdrawal of the state marketing agencies 
and the emergence of the private sector were large scale 
enterprises, such as Peoples Trading Centre (PTC), 
Agricultural Trading Centre (ATC), Farmers World, Agora, 
Kulima Gold and Miombo Investments. The gap left by 
the state agencies, however, was not filled by the private 
sector in the way that was expected (Chinsinga 2004; 
Owusu and N’gambi 2002; Oxfam 2002). The agro-
dealership initiative that was ongoing at this time led to 
the establishment of input outlets in rural areas; however, 
this development was derailed following the advent of 
FISP. Most of the agro-dealers that emerged with support 
from RUMARK and AISAM prior to FISP were subsequently 
driven out of business following its introduction. A few 
of these agro-dealers, however, did remain, ‘but these 
are mostly based at trading centres for most part of the 
year and venture out into the remote areas once the FISP 
season kicks in’ xliv, and their ‘ business portfolios are 
widely diversified to smooth their income flows during 
the off season’ xlv. These agro-dealers venture out into 
remote areas at the peak of FISP and limit their operations 
to trading centres once FISP season comes to an end. 
The large scale enterprises concentrate their activities 
in trading centres or semi-urban areas, justifying their 
presence in these areas as ‘business logic’. They argue 
firstly that ‘we cannot go where there are no markets, 
roads are in a state of disrepair and security of our stocks 
is not guaranteed’ xlvi and secondly that ‘farmers would 
like to get their inputs from well known trading centres 
to guarantee reliability of their products’ xlvii. 
The largesse associated with FISP has led to a boom 
of seasonal agro-dealers. Out of the 21 agro-dealers 
interviewed in Thyolo and Dedza districts, 15 of these 
were seasonal agro-dealers. The 15 seasonal agro-dealers 
rolled out their businesses between 2006 and 2010 
following the launch of FISP. Of the remaining six, four 
were large-scale, permanent agro-dealers and two were 
agro-dealers with medium-sized enterprises. During an 
interview held with an MoAFS official, it was observed 
that ‘most agro-dealers come with FISP when it starts 
and go with it at its end’ xlviii; and ‘we just see the so-called 
agro-dealers only when FISP season starts and they 
disappear as soon as it is over’ xlix. The agro-dealers made 
no secret that their target is to make profit through FISP, 
not an eagerness to support farmers. Most of seasonal 
agro-dealers indicated that they close down their 
businesses ‘as soon as FISP season comes to an end’l. 
Some even confessed that they were established solely 
‘to get involved in FISP, otherwise the capital requirements 
to operate as a commercially viable agro-dealer are 
prohibitive’ li. 
The seasonality of agro-dealers is further reinforced by 
the practice of seed companies who venture out to collect 
excess inventories from their agro-dealers for custody in 
their warehouses as soon as the government declares the 
end of FISP season. Consequently, seasonal agro-dealers 
‘withdraw from rural areas either when the government 
declares the end of FISP season or when coupons simply 
dry up’ lii since they know ‘they will make losses when they 
stay in the village; they will not make money by being 
permanent’ liii. Agro-dealers then close up shop waiting 
for the return of FISP for the next growing season. As 
winter cultivation is becoming increasingly important in 
the face of uncertain climate patterns, the seasonality of 
agro-dealers makes it extremely difficult for farmers to 
access productivity enhancing inputs and technologies 
(Chinsinga et al. 2011). The concern is that for these agro-
dealers ‘selling seeds is like selling umbrellas; most shops 
will stock umbrellas during the rainy season and stop 
once it is dry because there is no longer a market’ liv. 
This sentiment is further supported by the testimonies 
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of the agro-dealers, who indicated that their outlets ‘will 
be closed when FISP season comes to an end and will be 
reopened next year when FISP is back’ lv. The seasonal 
orientation of agro-dealers is creating a huge service gap 
to farmers, exposing ‘an urgent need to find a better way 
of retaining agro-dealers’ lvi. 
The dominance of seasonal agro-dealers defeats the 
original purpose of FISP to drive the expansion of the 
input distribution networks to farmers who are located 
in zones that are chronically underserved (Crawford et 
al. 2003; Kelly et al. 2003). FISP was meant to ensure that 
agro-dealers would be entrepreneurs based in their 
respective localities providing a service to farmers 
throughout the year. A critically important role for agro-
dealers would be to serve as a referral point in case of 
problems and challenges that would arise for farmers as 
they put into practice new agricultural methods/
technologies or planted new seed varieties. In addition, 
it was thought that agro-dealers would provide backup 
extension services to farmers, especially in light of the 
government’s thin cadre of extension staff.
Whilst the training of the agro-dealers was mistargeted 
during Phase 1 of the agro-dealership initiative, the 
emergence of seasonal agro-dealership wrought further 
damage to the programme. Most of the agro-dealers 
involved in FISP have not gone through formal training, 
and thus they do not possess the knowledge base they 
require to be able to impart sufficient product 
recommendations and advice to their shop attendant 
intermediaries. Most attendants indicated that they rely 
on the leaflets provided with the seed to offer technical 
advice to farmers about how to maximize returns from 
inputs. They also use their own personal experiences to 
advise farmers on how to make productive use of the 
inputs. The tendency of those agro-dealers that do have 
direct contact with farmers is to frame their advice in a 
way ‘that makes farmers buy their products, or the best 
they can do is simply read out the instructions on the 
leaflets to farmers’ lvii. The advice provided to farmers is 
more from a marketing point of view than from an 
agricultural perspective. Some agro-dealers even 
objected to the idea of providing extension services to 
farmers, arguing that ‘there is no need to provide 
extension services to farmers since they are already 
knowledgeable about farming; we simply handle issues 
on the marketing side of things’ lviii.
The role that agro-dealers play in the provision of FISP 
extension services is in tune with the latest policy on 
extension. There were, however, serious concerns on the 
part of agricultural officers about whether FISP agro-
dealers were an appropriate vehicle for providing reliable 
extension services to farmers. Agricultural officials 
described agro-dealers as being commanded by a 
‘vendor’s mentality’, doubting as to whether these 
representatives would provide extension advice to 
farmers on an objective basis. They argued that these 
agro-dealers simply ‘look at the farmer as somebody with 
the capacity to make them rich because he or she has a 
voucher, but not as somebody in need of extension 
services since that is regarded as the job of extension 
workers’ lix. The widespread perception among agricultural 
officials is that as vendors, agro-dealers are determined 
to push their product at whatever cost, even so far as 
cheating farmers. The seasonality and unorganized 
distribution of agro-dealers across districts increases the 
propensity to cheat, as dealers may or may not operate 
in the same area from once year to the next, and so 
denying farmers the opportunity to hold them 
accountable. 
District Agricultural Development Officers (DADOs) 
are mandated to monitor FISP sales in order to compile 
data that is used for crop estimates in their respective 
areas of jurisdiction. DADOs argue that it is extremely 
difficult to monitor sales of the seasonal agro-dealers 
because they often do not have stationary marketing 
points. They tend to follow farmers to the fertilizer 
distribution centres so that ‘as they [farmers] get fertilizer, 
they can buy seed as well’ lx. The absence of a policy 
framework and the boom of seasonal agro-dealers makes 
it difficult to coordinate their activities. 
Despite concerns about the current status of agro-
dealers, there is consensus across stakeholders about 
the desirability of agro-dealers’ continued involvement 
in FISP. The main justification for this is the argument 
that government agencies alone cannot satisfy farmers’ 
input requirements. Agro-dealers dramatically reduce the 
distance that farmers have to travel since ‘they operate 
right in villages, even though only for a short period of 
time’ lxi. Without agro-dealers ‘farmers will suffer a great 
deal because they will have to cover long distances to 
get seed’ lxii. Moreover, agro-dealers are not encumbered 
by bureaucratic red tape that characterizes the state 
marketing agencies. Whilst not an ideal situation, agro-
dealers are driven by the desire to maximize profit, which in 
turn leads them to ‘serve farmers as long as [it is profitable 
to do so], unlike the government marketing outlets that 
have fixed business hours and where sometimes sales 
are delayed because of lack of stationary’ lxiii.
The dominance of profit-driven agro-dealers within 
FISP is a cause of real concern. Farmers may enjoy 
reduced distances to input supply points as long as the 
government continues with FISP, but this and other such 
benefits come at great cost and are merely temporary 
if improvement and enforcement of the role of agro-
dealers is not dealt with. Fundamental changes in the 
operation of agro-dealers must take place if FISP is to 
lay a strong foundation for private sector led-gricultural 
growth, and the transformation of rural areas. 
4.2.3 Limited Attention to 
Agro-ecological 
Appropriateness of 
Seeds
There is strong incentive for agro-dealers to sell as 
much as they can since the magnitude of their profit is 
dependent on the volume of sales. This has invariably 
led to aggressive marketing techniques that are 
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undermining the appropriate agro-ecological distribution 
of seed. This aggressive behavior leaves farmers with little 
choice but to accept seed that may not be agronomically 
suitable to their respective areas, subsequently 
compromising farmers’ harvest potential. The following 
paragraphs will go into further detail on the aggressive 
marketing techniques that agro-dealers adopt, as well 
as the impact that this approach to agricultural extension 
has on farmers.
Legume seed is greatly desired by farmers, yet it is 
often in short supply, in both  formal and informal seed 
arenas. One such aggressive technique that agro-dealers 
have adopted is to the exploit the shortage of legume 
seed in order to force farmers to buy maize seed, 
regardless of the agronomical suitability of those seeds 
for the particular area. The reasoning behind this action 
is that farmers do not pay top up costs on legume seed, 
as is required for maize seed, but rather exchange 
coupons for the seed. Coupon exchange, however, does 
not bring in immediate revenue to agro-dealers. Whilst 
theoretically farmers have the freedom of choice to buy 
maize and legume seed from different agro-dealers, in 
practice accessing alternatives is impossible for many 
farmers living in remote rural areas. The following 
sentiments are illustrative of the pressures that farmers 
face: ‘buy everything from here’ lxiv; ‘go back and get maize 
seed from where you got the legume seed’ lxv; ‘buy our 
maize seed if you want us to provide you with legume 
seed as well’ lxvi; and ‘farmers are forced not to split their 
coupons by agro-dealers who are intent on maximizing 
profit yet infringing on farmers’ freedom of choice’ lxvii. 
It is also argued that agro-dealers venture out into 
villages for the principal reason of catching as many 
customers as possible in order maximize their returns. 
Agro-dealers, including large traders such as Farmers 
World, Agora, Chipuku and Kulima Gold, market their 
seeds using mobile markets. They go out into villages 
on specified voucher distribution dates so that farmers 
can buy seed directly from them. The official account of 
this service given by agro-dealers is that ‘we want to serve 
farmers better, we do not want farmers to travel long 
distances to get seeds as they lose out time’ lxviii. The 
downside of this practice is that agro-dealers often go 
out independently of other dealers. Farmers are denied 
the choice of dealer, and therefore also the choice of 
seed that could be sparked from service provision 
competition. As it stands, farmers have to buy the seed 
that is on offer as ‘there is only one agro-dealer at the 
time of coupon distribution’ lxix. In remote areas, agro-
dealers use the mobile marketing strategy to further 
exploit farmers. Most of the agro-dealers that manage 
to access the hard to reach places demand that farmers 
pay more than MK 100 on top, justifying the increased 
price as ‘a means for them to cover transport costs’ lxx. 
Poorer farmers therefore end up paying doubly: more 
for the ill-suited seed and more for the ‘privilege to access 
FISP seed on their door steps’ lxxi. As a strategy to 
outcompete the small agro-dealers, some medium sized 
agro-dealers do not require farmers to pay the MK 100 
top up for the maize seed. Instead, they directly exchange 
the maize seed with the required coupons at the 
distribution centres. Whilst there are often several agro-
dealers at the fertilizer distribution centres, farmers are 
attracted to the seed for which no top up is required, 
‘even if it may not be agronomically suitable for their 
respective areas but then it is an opportunity to save 
their MK 100’ lxxvii. 
Seed companies also seek to benefit from the 
aggressive marketing techniques of agro-dealers, 
reflecting their underlying interests in maximizing their 
profits through FISP. Most agro-dealers open up 
marketing outlets within the proximity of fertilizer 
distribution centres that are run by ADMARC and SFFRFM. 
As farmers are buying their fertilizer, they should also be 
buying seed. While ADMARC and SFFRFM also stock seed, 
seed companies prefer to channel their seed through 
agro-dealers because they can push the seed farther and 
sometimes for higher prices. It is estimated that up 65 
percent of the seed for the 2010/11 FISP was channeled 
through agro-dealers, compared to 45 percent from the 
previous season. 
Aggressive marketing practices have also led to 
corruption between agro-dealers and chiefs. In an effort 
to outdo each other, agro-dealers seek favours from 
chiefs in the form of recommendations for their specific 
products, as it is known that ‘chiefs wield enormous 
influence over their subjects’ lxxiii. Consequently, even in 
cases where farmers have had an opportunity for seed 
choice, many capitulate to the influence of their chiefs, 
meaning that again farmers end up not getting the most 
appropriate seeds for their respective areas or fair seed 
prices. 
4.2.4 Promotion of Foreign 
Germ Plasma
The FISP institutional arrangement for the seed 
component of their programme is greatly contributing 
to the promotion of foreign germ plasma (Chinsinga 
2011). To reiterate, it is only seed companies that can 
redeem vouchers from the government which means 
agro-dealers can only participate in FISP through seed 
companies. The promotion of foreign germ plasma is 
inevitable since multinational seed companies, which 
control 90 percent of the formal seed industry, deal 
almost exclusively in hybrid and OPV maize. There is 
evidence from the fieldwork conducted by this study to 
suggest that the share of OPV maize is rapidly declining. 
Since the 2007/08 growing season, the share of hybrid 
maize has been increasing, now constituting almost 85 
percent of the total maize sales under FISP (Chirwa and 
Dorward 2010). This finding is further supported by the 
observations of agro-dealers: ‘OPV is not commonly 
planted by farmers hence is not commonly stocked’ lxxiv; 
‘we stock what is demanded by farmers; the demand for 
OPV maize is insignificant’ lxxv; and ‘seed companies do 
not prioritize OPV; it constitutes a very small proportion 
of seeds that they deliver to us under FISP’ lxxvi. 
A shift in the seed providers of the Malawian seed 
industry has also led to genetically modified (GM) crop 
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promotion. In the past, the National Seed Company of 
Malawi (NSCM) was the exclusive actor in the formal seed 
industry. Multinational seed companies now dominate 
this scene, with enormous consequences for the national 
breeding system and for the diversity of seed supplies 
offered to farmers. As touched on previously, although 
FISP agro-dealers have a limited supply of legume seed 
to offer, this seed is critical in restoring and preserving 
soil health, enhancing farmers’ nutrition, and boosting 
household incomes (Chinsinga et al. 2011; Potter 2005). 
Most of the multinational seed companies, however, do 
not deal in legume seed, let alone any other important 
native seed varieties, such as sorghum and millet.  Rather, 
their strategy is to provide FISP agro-dealers almost 
exclusively with hybrid and OVP maize seed to sell. The 
only exception to this is permanent agro-dealers who 
are able to stock seeds from a broader range of seed 
companies.  A disproportionate share of their inventory, 
however, is still dominated by FISP seed, which in turn 
is provided by multinational companies.
Both farmers and agricultural officials described the 
seed procured through FISP as inadequate. Farmers have 
to complement the supply with seeds from other sources. 
Most of the farmers that are not beneficiaries of FISP 
resort to informal alternative sources to fully meet their 
seed requirement. For instance, some farmers observed 
that ‘the 5 kg of seed we get through FISP is not enough; 
we have to complement it with seed selected from our 
previous harvests’ lxxvii. Farmers require approximately 10 
kg of seed for an acre and 25kg of seed for a hectare. 
According to agricultural officials, however, the seed that 
farmers receive from FISP is inadequate for a 0.5 acre 
plot. The scarcity of seed is further augmented due to 
the widespread tendency among chiefs to instruct ‘FISP 
beneficiaries to share seed and fertilizer with those that 
did not get coupons’ lxxviii.
There are several alternative seed sources for farmers: 
local informal markets, recycling of seed from previous 
harvests, and NGO seed schemes. Farmers argue that it 
is cheaper to purchase seed from local markets than to 
buy it from agro-dealers. The popular view among 
farmers and agricultural officials is that farmers are too 
poor to afford seed at the market price. While a 5kg pack 
of maize is sold at MK 1,750 from agro-dealer outlets, 
farmers can get the same quantity from local market 
vendors at MK 400. In most FGDs farmers argued ‘vendors 
do come to our rescue since we often do not have money 
to buy seed from shops; vendors sell to us in portions 
we can afford and at far more reasonable prices’ lxxix. 
Farmers also recycle seed, acquiring the seed from their 
own storage facilities or from friends and relatives. 
Interviewees recounted that they ‘target maize cobs that 
look healthier than the rest to ensure that the seed 
germinate with vigour’ lxxx. Additionally, where NGOs are 
present farmers are reported to benefit from their seed 
schemes in their respective impact areas. In Dedza, for 
instance, Save the Children has been distributing seed 
to farmers in three Group Headmen in Bembeke EPA 
since 2009. Self Help International distributed seeds to 
targeted farmers in the same area between 2001 and 
2008. The main issues with NGO seed provision, however, 
are the unchequed distribution of GM seed and the 
further undermining of the national seed industry. 
There is great potential for the bulk-buying of seed 
by farmers, which is an especially important strategy 
for resource-constrained farmers, as not all of these are 
beneficiaries of FISP. The experiences of Linthipe EPA in 
Dedza illustrate this identified need. With 26 sections 
to the district, 48,070 resource-poor farmers from 792 
villages were registered as potential FISP beneficiaries, 
however, only 12,979 received FISP coupons. This means 
that 73 percent of the total in need did not receive support. 
Such families must then resort to getting seed through 
relatives and friends, seed recycling, NGO handouts, and 
informal local markets. In two EPAs in Dedza, agricultural 
officials took action, organizing farmers to buy improved 
seed in bulk. This was triggered by the realization that 
‘5kg of maize seed under FISP is not enough for farmers to 
plant in their gardens’lxxxi. Agricultural officials noted that 
farmers who had resorted to seed recycling to fill this need 
then faced ‘dramatically reduced yield vigour especially 
if the seed is not OPV’ lxxxii. They reported that farmers are 
recycling hybrid seed because ‘the injection of OPVs into 
the farming system since the advent of FISP has been 
limited’ lxxxiii. Agricultural officials organized farmers into 
Village Headman Groups, with each group comprising of 
roughly 300 members. Each member then contributed 
MK 1000 (about US $7), spreading payments over several 
months prior to the onset of the farming season. The 
agricultural officials persuaded the multinational seed 
company Monsanto to deliver the seeds to farmers, 
having first negotiated bulk price reductions for the 
improved. The farmers that were involved in this initiative 
now intend to institutionalize this practice in order to 
ease access to improved seed, especially for those who 
do not directly benefit from FISP. An additional benefit 
with this arrangement is that farmers are also ‘assured of 
getting agronomically suitable seed products for their 
respective areas’ lxxxiv.
4.2.5 Politics of ADMARC: A 
Return to State 
Marketing?
There is current apprehension over Malawian 
government plans to revive ADMARC to its state-led 
pre-liberalization functionality through a new Act of 
Parliament. While the new Act is yet to be finalized, the 
main concern is that the ‘reenacted ADMARC will assume 
monopolistic control over input and output markets 
which may crowd out agro-dealers altogether’ lxxxv. In 
other words, a reenacted ADMARC poses serious 
challenges to private sector development especially 
‘since agro-dealers are handling about 65 percent of the 
seed under FISP’ lxxxvi. 
There is contentious debate over the role of ADMARC, 
as re-instating this role would have particular political 
significance for FISP and its functionaries. As observed 
from past applications of ADMARC, the corporation was 
shown to be easily manipulated to serve political 
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campaign purposes and social functions given the 
primacy of maize in the country’s political economy 
(Harrigan 2005; Sahely et al. 2005). ADMARC has also 
been brought under direct control of the Office of 
President and Cabinet (OPC), which leads to further 
concern over political manipulation and public 
exploitation. Stakeholders in the current system observe 
with unease that ADMARC is complaining that agro-
dealers are muddling the goals of FISP, suggesting that 
the scale of agro-dealer involvement should be limited. 
It is argued by stakeholders, however, that that ADMARC 
is simply trying to ‘reassert its relevance since it is facing 
considerable competition from agro-dealers while 
protecting the strategic political interests of the ruling 
elite’ lxxxvii.
At the peak of liberalization, ADMARC outlets had 
shrunk to as low as 180 units (Mvula et al. 2003). By the 
2009/10 FISP season, however, the number of operated 
markets had grown to 788 in number. This figure rose 
again to 904 during the 2010/11 FISP season, and 
although the new ADMARC Act is still being prepared, 
ADMARC is currently engaging in an expansion drive. This 
is seen by many FISP stakeholders as a potential threat to 
agro-dealer involvement in FISP. The speculation is that 
‘the expansion of ADMARC outlets will continue as we 
approach the next general elections in 2014 because of 
the strategic political importance of FISP’ lxxxviii. 
A coalition of NGOs operating as Civil Society Network 
on Agriculture (CISANET), on the other hand, support 
the idea of ADMARC reverting to its pre-liberalization 
status due to its current state of dysfunctionality and its 
significant drain on government resources. As an integral 
part of the liberalization package of the agricultural sector, 
the status of ADMARC was registered as a limited liability 
company in order for it ‘to operate on a profit basis since 
it was a huge fiscal drain’ lxxxix. The agreement was that 
ADMARC would be commercialized on condition that the 
government would support it to serve social functions. 
The social functions of ADMARC include making maize 
available to the vulnerable segments of society during 
periods of severe food insecurity and propping up prices 
of farm produce when the prices are very low to shield 
farmers from undue exploitation from the private traders 
who are driven by the search for supernormal profits. 
By virtue of being a limited company, ADMARC was not 
able to receive direct funding from government, but 
rather would operate using government-guaranteed 
loans. Its performance has been less than satisfactory, 
however, incurring heavy losses due to the dominance 
of social functions through FISP. This is the case because 
ADMARC has to make sure that fertilizer is available across 
the country regardless whether the areas are readily 
accessible or not. These areas would not be served if the 
exercise were to be carried out by the private sector. The 
concern of NGOs is that through the loans guaranteed 
for ADMARC, the government is spending much more 
than would have been the case if government supported 
ADMARC directly from its budget. This would be cost 
effective for purposes of performing social functions 
since the government ‘would not have to grapple with 
bad debts accumulated by ADMARC’ xc.
Whilst NGOs are concerned with the magnitude of 
the costs associated with ADMARC’s current institutional 
arrangement, the government has exploited the situation 
as an opportunity to reintroduce the pre-liberalization 
ADMARC status. This is not an adequate solution to the 
problems facing ADMARC and FISP, however, as the 
pre-liberalized ADMARC was condemned on the grounds 
of inefficiencies in both input and output markets (Nthara 
2002; Oxfam 2002). Even though there are pertinent 
concerns with the current trends, developments and 
sustainability of FISP, the progressive expansion of 
strategically political ADMARC poses a direct threat to 
private sector development. Additionally, neither 
approach is able to engineer and realize the original 
version of the agro-dealership. 
The present contestation over of the future of the 
Malawian seed industry leaves none in doubt over the 
political nature of the process, twisting programmes 
intended for the improvement of the livelihoods of 
resource-poor farmers for elite gain (Leftwich and Hogg 
2007). It seems that the underlying goals of policy 
processes in such situations are to serve selfish motives 
rather than act in service to those who have true need.
5. Concluding Remarks and 
Reflections
While there are several competing explanations about 
the failure of agricultural sector liberalization in Malawi, 
there seems to be some consensus that its dismal track 
record can largely be attributed to the lack of 
complementary investment in public goods that should 
have supported the implementation of the prescribed 
set of interventions. The argument is that Asian countries 
were successful because they focused primarily on the 
non-price stimulants that influence macro-economic 
decision making. In other words, Asian countries invested 
heavily in the requisite public goods, such as agricultural 
research, extension, credit and fertilizer supply and 
distribution systems, that made it possible for the 
recovery of the agricultural sector on a sustainable basis 
(Crawford et al. 2003; Dessai 1988). At the onset of the 
liberalization of the Malawian agricultural sector, however, 
investment in agro-dealers was seen as the solution to 
revitalizing the involvement of the private sector in 
agricultural growth and development, with tremendous 
potential for sustainable poverty reduction. The role of 
the agro-dealership initiative in delivering ’smart’ 
subsidies was believed to act as spring board for an 
African Green Revolution. The findings of this study, 
however, have demonstrated that the apparent failure 
of the liberalization of the agricultural sector can actually 
be linked to the failure of the agro-dealership initiative 
to produce anticipated outcomes. Instead of facilitating 
the recovery of the agricultural sector, the liberalization 
policy package simply exacerbated existing problems, 
resulting in further diminishment of farmers’ access to 
productivity enhancing inputs and technologies (Kelly 
et al. 2003; Mwase 1998). 
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This study has demonstrated that while there is 
tremendous potential for agro-dealership to anchor or 
drive the African Green Revolution there are still several 
key issues and challenges that have to be addressed. 
These challenges have become particularly important 
following the implementation of FISP since the 2005/06 
growing season. FISP has substantially transformed the 
operative context for agro-dealers in a way that is less 
supportive to the attainment of the sustainable version 
of the uniquely African Green Revolution. Instead of 
functioning as the engine of a private sector-led 
agricultural recovery, FISP has been captured by a 
network of elites who have appropriated it as a source 
for their own security and political enhancement, under 
the guise of broadening farmers’ access to productivity 
enhancing inputs and technologies. The following 
conclusions are drawn with respect to the study’s main 
observations.
While agro-dealers operated mainly in high potential  •
areas during Phase 1 of the agro-dealership initiative, 
following the advent of FISP during the 2005/06 
growing season they expanded to operating almost 
equally in both high and low potential areas. However, 
rather than seeking to aid farmers in realizing their 
agricultural potential, instead agro-dealers are chasing 
coupons and financial profits. Strong evidence supports 
the argument that the distribution of coupons by agro-
dealers is not necessarily determined by the agricultural 
potential of the districts but rather by strategic political 
decisions (Chirwa and Dorward 2010). 
Agro-dealers supply mostly hybrid and OPV maize seed  •
from large multinational seed companies, however, 
there is evidence that the proportion of OPV has 
substantially diminished in recent years. This has been 
further bolstered by the advent of FISP whereby most 
of the agro-dealers are seasonal and only stock seed 
from companies with which they have contracts. Agro-
dealers do not deal in alternative cereals such as 
sorghum and millet and very few stock legumes 
because most of the multinational companies do not 
deal in these products. They deal almost exclusively 
in hybrid maize.
Most farmers do not rely on agro-dealers for their seed  •
requirements. The purpose of FISP is to target resource-
constrained farmers, but as was revealed above, only 
manages to reach a fraction of the identified 
beneficiaries. Moreover, most farmers are unable to 
procure seeds from agro-dealers on a cash basis, 
arguing that it is very expensive. Farmers also state 
that the FISP seed component does not fully meet 
their needs. Beneficiaries are required to complement 
FISP-supplied seed with that from other sources, which 
mainly include recycling, buying from local informal 
markets, handouts from NGOs and relatives and 
friends. 
Agro-dealerships are mostly owned by elites who make  •
connections with government- donor/NGO 
programmes or large scale seed houses. Elite capture 
of the agro-dealership initiative started with the 
collapse of the tripartite arrangement in the first phase 
of agro-dealership but has intensified since the advent 
of FISP during the 2005/06 growing season. Social 
networks and informal ties have become extremely 
important for agro-dealers to secure contracts with 
seed companies since it is possible to venture into 
agro-dealership without any substantial capital 
injection. This corruption within FISP has made it 
vulnerable to unrestrained opportunities for rent-
seeking.
The terms of engagement between agro-dealers and  •
seed companies is skewed in favour of seed companies. 
This biased relationship began during the first phase 
of agro-dealership and has further developed in FISP. 
Agro-dealership is attainable without an injection of 
capital, but only so as long as the dealer is able to 
secure a contract with seed companies, this being done 
through networking. Seed companies then deliver 
inputs directly to the agro-dealers. Dealers thus start 
earning from their stocks immediately, as top-ups and 
coupons from farmers are exchanged for seed 
packs.
Over time, large agro-dealers (especially multinationals)  •
are dominating the supply of seed in the formal system, 
reducing the proportion of locally bred seed by 
national public systems. The institutional arrangement 
for the seed component of FISP has further reinforced 
this situation since it is only those companies that 
belong to the Seed Traders Association of Malawi 
(STAM) that can redeem coupons from government. 
The liberalization of the seed industry has resulted in 
multinational seed companies controlling 90 percent 
of the seed market. This has substantially marginalized 
the public breeding system, which is now on the verge 
of collapse.
The variety of seed available to farmers through agro- •
dealers has declined over time. The findings from this 
study have established that agro-dealers stock almost 
exclusively hybrid maize, as this is the main seed that 
multinational companies deal in. The proportion of 
OPV maize has substantially decreased since the 
2005/06 growing season. FISP agro-dealers often stock 
only seed from companies with which they have 
contracts, and very few companies provide legume, 
millet and sorghum seed. Legume seed is particularly 
scarce, and used by agro-dealers as strategic bait to 
force farmers to buy maize seed that may not be 
agronomically suitable for their respective localities. 
The operative context for agro-dealers has been 
substantially transformed following the advent of FISP. 
As a government and donor supported programme, it 
has created spaces for stakeholder engagement that 
were not available prior to its implementation. Whilst 
providing a means for new and constructive opportunities, 
the deficiencies of this transformation have also made 
the programme vulnerable to corruption and exploitation: 
donors are supporting FISP as long as it provides the 
platform for the inclusion of agro-dealers as a strategic 
means of revitalizing the participation of the private 
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sector in agricultural development; seed companies 
regard FISP as a guaranteed market for their products; 
and the government is interested in achieving food 
security at whatever cost. The widespread use of hybrid 
maize is seen as a magic bullet to achieving food security 
but at the expense of narrowing down the product 
portfolio on offer to farmers, thereby increasing farmer 
insecurity and decreasing soil health and future 
productivity through the reduction in diversity. And as 
illustrated throughout this paper, FISP has simply created 
expansive opportunities for rent-seeking both in the 
procurement and distribution of FISP inputs. Given the 
negative transformative impact of FISP on the operative 
context of agro-dealers, it is doubtful whether they would 
act as an anchor to, let alone drive, a sustainable African 
Green Revolution.
Although the current state of agro-dealership has 
serious issues that need to be addressed, the potential 
still exists for the initiative to drive the revival of agriculture 
in Malawi, as long as efforts would be taken to design 
and enforce a robust policy and institutional framework. 
Such efforts, however, are likely to face resistance given 
the expansive rent-seeking opportunities associated with 
FISP. Most of the challenges revealed by this study have 
to do with either the absence or weak enforcement of 
policy and regulatory frameworks for agro-dealers 
specifically and the seed industry generally. There is 
therefore urgent need to develop a policy and institutional 
framework for the agro-dealership initiative that would 
outline legitimate practices and expectations that would 
effectively power a uniquely African version of a Green 
Revolution. The simple development of such a framework 
would not be adequate, however, but would necessitate 
the simultaneous need for full programme enforcement, 
regardless of the resistance that such an act would likely 
be met with. 
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